Unfavourable investment data – risks to economic growth? by Péter Gál
INTRODUCTION
In 2006, the volume of national economy investment in
Hungary dropped for the first time in the last 10 years.
Investment in the export-oriented manufacturing industry
started to decrease even before the announcement of the
fiscal adjustment package. In the past, international economic
expansion, primarily in the Western European countries, was
the most important driver for investment by domestic
industrial producers. Therefore, in light of the presently
favourable developments abroad, the current drop-off in
investment is surprising and represents a cause for concern
with regard to Hungary’s potential growth.
Consequently, it is very important to understand what factors
are behind the weak performance of manufacturing
investment, and to investigate to what extent these factors
can be regarded as temporary or permanent. This paper
addresses these issues, after describing the general role of
investment and some stylised facts, as well as briefly
explaining the investment behaviour of the sectors (non-
tradable corporations, households, government) determined
primarily by domestic demand.
THE GENERAL ROLE OF INVESTMENT
Developments in economy-wide investment deserve attention
in three main respects. First, investment is an important
element of aggregate demand: in Hungary, similarly to the
converging countries, it amounts to 20-25% of GDP, and,
due to its volatility, it also has a significant impact on changes
in GDP.
3 As part of aggregate demand, it influences the
current output gap and thus the current demand-side
inflationary pressure as well.
Secondly, as a result of investment, the available capital of the
economy expands. That is, there are more production
facilities and thus higher potential GDP. Therefore, on the
supply side, investment determines to a significant degree
potential future economic growth, that is, a growth rate
along which the output gap is zero and no demand side
inflationary pressure arises.
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Future potential economic growth is a factor of key importance in judging the expected output gap and the inflationary pressure
it entails. One important element of potential growth is the level and growth of real capital, which is materialized via
investment. The tendency of investments thus provides an indication on the future potential growth. On the other hand,
investments in the economy are part of aggregate demand, and thus in addition to its impact in the future, it also affects the
present output gap and inflationary pressure. Finally, investments also offer insight into the expectations of economic actors
regarding future prospects.
The decline in the volume of investment registered in 2006, unprecedented in the last ten years, thus has particular significance
from the central banks' perspective. This decline was experienced in a wide range of breakdowns: among the types of investment
assets (construction, machinery purchases) as well as in corporate and household sector private investment. The drop in the
household and non-tradable corporate sectors is in line with weak domestic demand resulting from the fiscal adjustment. But
the fall of investment in the tradable sector is surprising in light of the favourable current state of and outlook for European
economic activity. Although there was a modest correction in this trend in the first quarter of 2007, a lasting weakness in capital
expansion may indicate the long-term presence of a disadvantageous investment climate in Hungary.
2
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1
1 I am grateful to Gábor Kiss and Mihály András Kovács, for their help and suggestions which greatly contributed to this paper, and to other colleagues in the Economic
and Monetary Policy Directorate, in the Financial Stability department and in the editorial board of MNB-Bulletin for their useful comments. All remaining errors are
my own responsibility.
2The MNB already indicated this problem in its 2006 publication “Analysis of the convergence process”, and also drew attention to it in the evaluation of the actual
developments in its inflation reports published in February and May 2007. As the data were unfavourable for several quarters, this highlights the possibility that the
trend was not temporary and would not correct itself automatically after the fiscal adjustment. Even though the Q1 2007 data show a significant increase in
investments in manufacturing, bearing in mind the noisiness of investment data (see Box), and the sustained trends that lasted for several quarters, this exceptionally
good data is considered, for the time being, as merely making up for several quarters of missed capital formation. Although this single data point has reduced the
risks of potentially unfavourable long-term prospects, in itself it does not invalidate the possibility of a slowing trend in investments. The objective of this paper is to
review the detailed arguments on the long-term or temporary nature of the investment problem and to describe the facts in more depth. 
3 Investments are one of the most volatile GDP components, and this is especially true in the converging countries (Benczúr-Rátfai, 2005).Finally, business investment reflects companies’ future
expectations. The reason for this is that investments are
worthwhile only if they are expected to be profitable
enough.
4
The relative importance of these three aspects differs
according to which sector (corporations, households or the
government) is investing. Additional investment by any sector
increases aggregate demand, however, from the aspect of
potential growth, corporate investment plays the most
important role. Although clearly-targeted and appropriately
implemented public investment – e.g. infrastructure
improvements – also has a beneficial impact on future
production potential, its effect is rather indirect and
uncertain, as it does not directly create production facilities.
5
Information on the private sector’s profitability prospects is
mainly reflected in the dynamics of corporate investment
and, to a lesser extent, in the dynamics of household
investment.
STYLISED FACTS ON HUNGARIAN
INVESTMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL
COMPARISON
The level of economic development is largely determined by
the amount of available real capital (machinery, equipment,
buildings, intangible assets, etc.). More capital can generate
higher income assuming constant levels of labour and
productivity.
6 Thus, in less developed countries with lower
per capita income, the per capita amount of capital is also
generally lower. Investing in capital in converging countries
with a lower amount of capital thus brings higher yields than
it would in a developed country. This potentially higher yield
motivates economic agents to expand capital at a faster pace
than generally seen in developed countries. The expansion of
fixed capital is, by definition, investment.
The goal of achieving convergence as fast as possible requires
that Hungary should also spend a higher proportion of its
total income on expanding the stock of real capital, i.e. on
investment, as compared to developed countries. One
indicator which captures this is the investment-to-GDP ratio.
In comparison with other countries, Hungary’s investment-
to-GDP ratio stabilized at a higher level than that of the
developed EU member states, in line with the expected
economic convergence and higher growth. However,
Hungary’s ratio stands at a somewhat lower level than that of
countries at a similar state of development (Figure 1). This
was especially evident in the period following the latest EU
expansion, starting from the end of 2004, when only Poland
has shown a lower investment rate than Hungary in the
region.
From the aspects of production capacities and possible future
sources of income, corporate investment and machinery
investment have special significance apart from the figures on
total investment.
7 As statistical methodology problems render
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4 Household investments are mainly the expansion of residential property, thus they are not influenced so much by the general, short-term and medium-term changes
in the economic cycle, but rather by the particular evolution of the property market, especially its supply side and the development of state subsidies. Over the long
term, the determining factors may be demographic trends, financial deepening accompanying the economic development, and, to a certain extent, long-term
income expectations.
5 From the aspects of the purpose of their use, investments funded by the European Union are similar to government investments. The MNB’s main finding in its
convergence analysis in 2006 was that, according to earlier European experience, these investments, in general, have a fairly modest additional growth effect.
6This can be illustrated within an aggregate production-function approach. According to this, the level of production (Y)in the economy depends on three factors: the
level of technology (A), the amount of available real capital (K) and the amount of labour (L).The general form is:
Y = f (A,K,L),
where the function f() is monotonously increasing in all of its variables.
7The other large group of investment goods cover construction investments. These investments are household, corporate property and infrastructure investment,
implemented typically through state contracts. Investment in intangible assets (e.g. computer software) is has small share in Hungary’s domestic investments,
constituting about 2-3% of all investments in the last few years. Out of these components, mostly the machinery-type investments move together with the economic
cycles (European Commission, DG Economic and Financial Affairs, 2007).
* Current price data expressed as a percentage of GDP, in a descending
order of the total investment rate between 2004-2006. No data is
available on Bulgarian machinery investment.
Sources: Eurostat and MNB calculations.
Figure 1
Total investments and machinery investments in
some of the new EU member states and in the













































































































Machinery investments/GDP, 2004–2006international comparison of the former breakdown difficult,
8
we use the latter, and look at the ratio of machinery
investment to GDP (Figure 1). The levels of these ratios are
less than half of total investment in every country. The level
in Hungary is higher than the average of the developed EU
countries, but is somewhat lower than in most of our regional
competitors (the new member states), and it also shows a
falling trend.
Furthermore, from the aspects of growth and aggregate
demand, the real growth difference between investment and
income also deserves attention. The relationship between
growth in investment and growth in income can be
demonstrated by the difference in their real growth rates.
This is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows that investment
can be considered a less powerful source of growth on the
demand-side than it is in the case of our competitors in the
region. Furthermore, the tendency seen in the difference of
growth rates reveals that, besides the Czech Republic,
Hungary is the only country where growth in investment has
been lower than GDP growth since the start of the current
upswing in the European economy in 2004. Consequently,
the expansion of capital may well have been lower than
necessary to serve the presently dynamic external demand,
and that may create a supply side problem as well. This
finding seems to be in line with some signs indicating that
Hungary is possibly less involved in the current European
economic boom than during earlier expansions.
9
Taking into consideration that Hungary’s lag behind the
region’s other countries is not significant in terms of per
capita income, the tendencies presented here do not indicate
that a serious investment problem has existed for a long time.
However, what needs to be emphasized is that these trend
put Hungary somewhere in the middle group among the
region’s countries and point in an unfavourable direction,
especially according to the 2006 data.
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Figure 2
Difference between the real growth rates of gross







































































































Notes: in a descending order of the average difference over the whole
period. EU-15: the EU member states’ average before EU enlargement in
2004.
Sources: Eurostat and MNB calculations.
The academic economic literature and empirical observations suggest
that the distribution of company-level investment is strongly
concentrated over time.
10This concentration is stronger than in the case
of other corporate-level variables (e.g. corporate value added) with
macro-economic significance. The analysis performed on Hungarian
data also supports this proposition: in the period reviewed (1994-2004),
the average company’s largest value added exceeded the company’s
average value added by 60%, while the largest investment is more than
two and a half times (260 per cent) higher than the investment of an
average year.
11,12 The cross-sectional distribution of companies is also
Difficulties in analysing investment data
8This is mainly due to the fact that the accounting of some large investments (e.g. infrastructure developments, PPP transactions etc.) is not clear, because it is sometimes
ambiguous whether they belong to the state or to the corporate sector.
9The question marks regarding Hungary’s export performance are presented in Box 2-1. of the MNB’s “Report on Inflation” (May 2007), and they also underpin this claim.
Furthermore, the 2006 manufacturing investment and production data since the middle of 2006 moved in an unfavourable direction compared to the dynamic growth
seen all over Europe.
10The theoretical explanation is mainly linked to the costs of the implementation of new investments, to the difficulties of disposing of used capital and to the
uncertainties regarding future profits. As a result, the reaction of capital to economic shocks is non-linear and consequently, investments are concentrated in time
around the occurrence of a major shock. The conclusion of studies on American data (Carruth et al., 1998, Doms–Dunne, 1998) gives empirical evidence that companies
strongly concentrate their investments over time.
11The analysis used companies’tax return data. Corporate level value added and investment data are approximated following the methodology described in the papers
of Kátay-Wolf (2004, 2007).
12The distribution of these company-specific ratios is strongly asymmetric (sloped to the right), therefore, we consider the average company to be the one with the







where i is the individual company, I
i
max is the value of maximum investment during the period of 1994-2004, I
i
average is the average investment value for the period. We
compared the median value of the distribution of these I
i-s with the median of the distribution of analogously defined company-specific value added ratios.UNFAVOURABLE INVESTMENT – RISKS TO ECONOMIC GROWTH? 
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more concentrated in the case of investments: on average for 2002-
2004, the 10 largest investors accounted for nearly one-quarter of all
investments, and the 50 largest accounted for nearly half of
investments. These proportions are lower in the case of value added
and number of employees, and this concentration difference has
increased since 1994.
13
Consequently, the analysis and forecasting of both micro-level and
macro-level investment becomes more complicated, since this strong
concentration may cause a higher probability that developments are
less synchronised among companies, and the individual effects
compared to the general economic trends have a stronger influence on
the aggregate numbers than in the case of other indices with more
even distribution in terms of time and cross-section.
14
Partly related to this issue is the fact that the volatility and seasonality of
aggregate (branch-level, economy-wide) investments are very strong
compared to other macro variables (Benczúr-Rátfai, 2005), and this
aggravates the problems related to the analysis and forecasting of
short-term processes. Hungary has a special feature in terms of
seasonality: among the OECD countries, only in Poland does the last
quarter’s data represent a higher (nearly 40%) proportion of the whole
year’s data than in Hungary.
Data availability is also a serious problem. The separation of aggregate
investment into economically relevant groups (e.g. business investment,
government-related investment, household investment) can only be
performed with very rough approximations. The fundamental question
from an aspect of the economy is whether the investment is of a
business nature and thus reflects the future expectations of private
companies, or the investment is initiated by the government. This,
however, cannot be pinpointed unambiguously from the quarterly time
series, because neither the legal corporate form (whether the party
investing is an enterprise or not) nor the branch data (agriculture,
manufacturing, etc.) reflect this aspect accurately. The reason why the
legal form may not be accurate is that there are several state-supported
companies which often make their investment decisions without
considering market prospects, even though they are legally qualified as
enterprises (e.g. BKV, MÁV, MVM, etc.). The problem with the branch-
based breakdown is that the individual branches, even in a relatively
detailed breakdown, include a mix of business-like enterprise companies
and companies with government-related investments.
15 Due to the
strong concentration and the sectoral breakdowns that can only be
monitored by means of approximations, especially in the case of
quarterly data publications, the short-term developments must be
evaluated with caution, taking into account several breakdowns (e.g.
branch-based, legal form based, types of assets) simultaneously.
Finally, it is important to note that investment data are revised relatively
often and to a great extent. This is most probably not a Hungary-specific
feature: for instance, the Bank of England also notes that investments
are subject to the most revisions among the GDP items in the United
Kingdom (Castle-Ellis, 2002).
Figure 3
Distribution of investment, value added and





























































































































*Company-level data are summed according to the rating intervals
(10 largest, 11-50th place, etc.), then these sums are divided by the
whole sample aggregates.
Source: Annual tax returns of companies with double-entry
bookkeeping (tax authority data).
13 Obviously, the members of the largest companies’group change over time. According to our preliminary calculations, these changes become visible mostly in the
investments.
14 A good example for this is the investment data for Q1 2007, showing an unprecedented, 53% increase in the volume of manufacturing investment. According to press
news, a multinational firm engaged in rubber manufacturing is implementing a roughly HUF 100 billion (EUR 400 million) investment in Hungary. In order to filter
out the impact of this huge investment, we estimated the manufacturing industry’s volume increase in investments without rubber manufacturing activity (NACE
code 25). Without this sub-industry, the result is a significantly lower 15-20% volume increase, which is approximately the same magnitude as was experienced in the
past economic booms of Hungary’s export markets.
15The Transport, storage and communication (letter I in NACE) branch is a good example for this, because it includes motorway building, railway track renovations and
investments of the Magyar Posta (Hungarian Postal Service), besides the investments of large business investors, e.g. that of Magyar Telekom.EVALUATION OF THE ACTUAL
DEVELOPMENTS
The robustness of the decline in investments in 2006 is
demonstrated by the fact that the volume of both machinery-
type and construction-type investment showed a decline in
the last two quarters as well as in the annual figures of 2006.
According to sectoral estimates, investment by branches
associated with the corporate and household sectors has also
decreased. Some growth was experienced in investments
related to the government caused by motorway construction,
but even this slowed down after the high growth rates of
2005.
16 In the following, we review the main reasons for the
weak investment intentions, sector by sector.
On average, corporate investment accounts for 55-60% of
total investment. Within this category, the investment climate
is clearly unfavourable for companies producing goods or
providing services for the domestic market. The reason for
this is that even though Hungary’s highly open economy is
heavily influenced by the present favourable external upturn,
the ongoing fiscal adjustment package will still cause a
slowdown in domestic activity over the next year or two. The
expected deceleration of domestic demand will have an
unambiguously negative impact on companies involved in the
non-tradable sector, beyond the impact of a more general,
unfavourable business environment also affecting export-
oriented industries, as described later.
Household capital formation accounts for 20-25% of total
investment, and is mostly related to real estate. It has also
moved in an unfavourable direction. This development was
in line with the downturn experienced in the real estate
market over the last two years. Due to the expected reduction
of households’ disposable income and also to the structural
problems in the real estate market (slow adjustment of prices
and quality), no significant change is expected over a one-to-
two year horizon.
The third large sector is the government: it implements
approximately 15-20% of investments in the economy.
Investments related to the government represent the most
variable items, and the uncertainties related to the accounting
of such investments (e.g. PPP transactions, quasi-fiscal
institutions, rating of public service providers) also make it
difficult to analyse and precisely separate them from
companies operating under market conditions (see Box). All
what can be stated with high certainty is that the pace of
motorway building slowed in 2006 compared to the earlier
high level, although it still had a positive impact on the total
investment figures. Looking ahead, there is a significant level
of uncertainty in this respect as well, because it is unknown
to what extent the infrastructure investments, partly financed
by EU funds, (metro line construction in Budapest, railway
improvements, road building, etc.) will replace already
planned investments, and/or to what extent they will be
accounted in the corporate or the government sector.
All of these developments thus can be directly or indirectly
explained by the government’s restriction on spending and by
the weakening domestic demand, both of which were
induced by the fiscal adjustment. As these factors are
expected to be temporary, the decline in investment is
probably also temporary in the sectors discussed so far. The
income of the manufacturing industry, which is one of
Hungary’s most important industries of terms of exports and
international competitiveness, is primarily determined by the
increasingly robust external demand. Accordingly, in the
past, the strongest driver for this industry’s investment
activity was European economic activity. However, the
relationship appears to be weakening, as this industry has
been gradually showing slower investment growth rates since
2004, whilst external demand has gathered pace. The
favourable figure for the first quarter of 2007, in itself, does
not rule out the possibility that Hungary may be facing a
longer-term investment problem. In order to explore this
issue, we must review the major factors influencing decisions
on corporate investment, and also look at how these factors
can explain the data over the last few years.
Thinking in a simplified corporate financing framework
using the discounted present value approach, investment is a
function of profits (cash-flow elements) and the cost of
capital (discount rate). The more favourable the profit
prospects, and the lower the costs of capital, the more
projects become worthwhile to implement, i.e. the more
sense it makes to invest.
17 Furthermore, the modern
theoretical and empirical economic literature puts an
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16The decline can be widely observed in other types of breakdowns as well: there was a reduction in the investment volume of nearly every legal form of corporate
enterprise (limited companies, joint stock companies, etc.). Furthermore, according to the breakdown by branches, a positive change in volume was experienced only
in the Hotels and restaurants and Financial intermediation branches and in the activities linked to the state (e.g. the Transport, storage and communication branch,
partially containing motorway building.). Even though in Box we note that the investment time series are revised relatively often and to a great extent, looking at
their past magnitude and the widely observed unfavourable tendencies of 2006, we can conclude that future possible revisions will probably not change the current
qualitative picture.
17 It is also worthwhile to mention that the majority of empirical analyses found that the income and the expected income have a relatively good explanatory power,
whilst the effects of the cost of capital are difficult to measure, especially at a macro-economic level. Based on Hungarian company-level data, Kátay-Wolf (2004)
showed a robust and significant relationship between company-level cost of capital and company-level investment, while the results of Reiff (2006) support
significant, albeit moderate, macro-effects of profitability shocks.increasingly strong emphasis on the crucial role of
uncertainty in determining investments. This is the so-called
real-option theory of investments (Carruth et al., 2000;
Carlsson, 2004; and Bond-Lombardi, 2004). The main driver
of the effect is that the adjustment of capital has significant
“sunk costs”. It means that if economic developments turn
unfavourable and if part of the capital becomes redundant,
then its disposal can only be done with significant losses. For
this very reason, in an uncertain economic or regulatory
environment (frequent, unexpected changes in taxes, etc.), it
is more worthwhile to wait and postpone investments.
Profits, which are the first and the empirically the most
important factor, deserve a breakdown to further elements.
These are the demand factors (revenues), productivity, and
the costs of production and of investment, including the
implicit costs incurred in running the business (e.g.
administration costs). The demand of export-oriented
industries is directly affected by external economic activity,
while – due to Hungary’s high degree of openness – it also
has an effect on non-tradable companies’ demand, although
this effect is indirect and operates with a lag.
Therefore, from the aspect of revenues, the actual demand
and future expectations of Hungary’s export markets
18 play a
key role in determining the export sector’s investment
activity, just as the data supports. In light of this, the strong
uncertainty which surrounded the sustainability of external
economic activity could well explain the slowdown in
investment in the manufacturing sector in 2004-2005 (Figure
6). This general, economic environment-driven uncertainty
clearly appeared in Hungary’s most important export market,
Germany. The IFO indices reflecting company managers’
expectations in Germany were at unusually high, historic
levels, and it was hard to reconcile with the actual data on
German industrial production dynamics. Furthermore,
German industrial orders, compared to earlier periods of
economic recovery, increased, in an unusual, volatile way
with repeated hiccups (Figure 5). A sort of “wait-and-see”
corporate behaviour due to these uncertainties was seen in
other countries in the region as well, and this is best captured
by the changes in machinery-type investment (Figure 4).
19
The uncertainty associated with future demand and the
ongoing strong growth in actual demand motivated
companies to pursue more intensive utilisation of current
capacities, rather than to initiate more costly investments.
This tendency was observed both in Hungary and in the
countries in the region (Figure 5), as reflected by the
historically high levels of the capacity utilisation indices.
20
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18 Hungary’s most important export markets are the developed EU member states, especially Germany.
19 Machinery-type investment characterise primarily industrial companies, and the majority of the industrial companies’investments are machinery-type investments.
Hence, the analysis of movements of machinery-type investments may be the right approach to the study industrial investments; that offer a wider range of available
international comparative data.
20 Although the last two Hungarian data points indicate a decrease, the capacity utilisation index of the Enterprise Analytical Institute (GVI) of the Hungarian Chamber
of Industry and Commerce shows a continuing increase reaching a historical record in Q1 2007. Hence all what we could robustly state on the level of capacity
utilisation is that it reached historical heights, but its actual tendency is not unambiguous so far.
Figure 4
Annual average volume indices of machinery-type




























































































































EU-15 Germany Czech Republic
Austria Slovenia Hungary
Data are unavailable for Germany in 2006.
Sources: Eurostat, KSH and MNB calculation.
Figure 5
Capacity utilisation in manufacturing in the region
and in Hungary’s major exports markets, and new
orders in German manufacturing 










































































































































* Year-on-year volume indices.
Sources: Eurostat and European Commission (Economic Sentiment
Indicators).The uncertainty was finally replaced by sustained, stronger-
than-expected external demand (German GDP growth in
2006 was 2.8% compared to expectations of around 1.2-
1.6% in 2005), accompanied by a continuous improvement
in future growth prospects.
21 Consequently, in the
neighbouring countries, relatively strong investment activity
started in 2005. In Hungary, just the opposite happened:
investment activity tapered off (Figure 4), and this divergent
path is apparent in total investment as well as machinery-type
investment, which is primarily implemented by industrial
companies.
Thus, even before the announcement of the fiscal adjustment,
divergence from the regional trend had already started, and,
as a result, the Hungarian economy experienced low
investment growth rates such as were last seen when the
European economy bottomed out in 2001-2002. Back then,
however, due to the American stock market bubble burst, the
deceleration in European growth was generally expected, and
therefore it might have seemed more wise to meet the still
strong European demand via higher capacity utilisation
rather than by implementing new investments.
22 This
explanation is further supported by the fact that similar
developments were seen in other countries in the region as
well as in Hungary’s export markets (Figures 4 and 5). The
economic downturn came relatively fast around 2001, and it
was accompanied by a change in capacity utilisation.
Around the end of 2005 and the beginning of 2006, it
became increasingly clear that growth prospects were
favourable in Europe, and they were indeed justified by the
data. However, in Hungary, investment missed the upturn,
therefore the companies can only satisfy the external demand
by means of historically high level of capacity utilisation. This
explains the seemingly contradicting numbers of low
investment, strong exports and industrial production growth
in 2006 (see Figure 6).
DOES HUNGARY FACE A LONG-TERM OR
TRANSITORY INVESTMENT PROBLEM?
The depressed investment intentions of Hungarian
companies may thus also be associated with country-specific
factors that cannot be linked exclusively to the increase of
financial burdens resulting from the austerity measures, as the
unfavourable trend was also observed before the
announcement of those measures. Consequently, we can
elaborate on two hypotheses on the future evolution of
investment: (1) a rapid, large-scale correction, in which case
the investment problem only arose due to temporary
uncertainties and merely prompted companies to “wait and
see”; or (2) a mild, slow correction that only makes up for the
missed investments of the past and may imply, even after the
disappearance of the temporary problems, lower investment
growth over the long term as well. If we wish to identify the
long-term or transitional nature of Hungary’s divergence
from the region, we must investigate the nature of the
country-specific factors. As already mentioned, companies’
profits are also influenced by other factors than demand;
productivity, competitiveness, the costs of production and
investments and the uncertainties associated with them (i.e.
costs of capital). Thus, we must seek an explanation among
these factors.
23
In addition to the technologies and efficient management
techniques applied by companies, the quality of the domestic
infrastructure, the perception of the operation of authorities
and the quality of human capital all determine the level of
current and expected corporate productivity achievable in
the domestic business environment. In its 2006 convergence
analysis, the MNB highlighted the fact that productivity
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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Figure 6
Investment, production and capacity utilisation in
manufacturing, and developments in external































































































Import based foreign demand* Export of goods*
Production in manufacturing* Investment in 
manufacturing* Capacity utilisation in 
manufacturing (left-hand scale)
* Annual average volume indices.
Sources: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Economic Sentiment
Indicators (European Commission) NIGEM database, MNB calculations.
21The major international forecasting institutes all project higher growth in Europe for the years to come than in their earlier projections.
22The MNB’s inflation report of December 2000 elaborates this hypothesis (page 41).
23 Changes in share prices of the companies provide us with important information on the expectations of the companies’profit generating ability. But, as a relatively
low number of companies of the Hungarian corporate sector are listed on the stock exchange, changes in the stock market indices do not give a true representation
of general profit expectations.growth in manufacturing decelerated significantly and
continuously up to 2004 (the analysis covers the period
between 1995 and 2004). If this unfavourable tendency has
continued and has become incorporated into long-term
expectations, this may have also contributed to the
unfavourable profit prospects in the Hungarian business
environment.
The fact that the country is ranked in a worsening position in
competitiveness and business environment rankigs of countries
is a telling sign regarding productivity developments and, more
generally, about the domestic business environment. In the
growth and competitiveness evaluation of the World
Economic Forum of Davos, Hungary was the country that saw
the greatest deterioration in its positions between 2001 and
2006 from among the region’s countries (Table 1). Last year,
only Poland and Lithuania were ranked behind Hungary. The
three groups of the aspects of the index are technology, public
institutions and the macro-economic environment, and an
absolute or relative worsening of Hungary’s position has been
noticed in all three of these categories. In another international
assessment, in the World Bank’s “Doing Business in …”
ranking, which reviews mainly the institutional aspects of
business environment of countries, Hungary dropped the most
in the region during 2005 and 2006, and only Poland is ranked
behind Hungary (Table 2). Hungary’s position has worsened in
nearly all determining factors, and the country was especially
low-ranked in terms of protection of investors, costs of
registering real estate property, and costs of establishing new
enterprises.
24
Surveys conducted among certain foreign investors may also
provide a plausible explanation for the weak industrial
investment activity in Hungary. The results of one of these,
conducted by the German Chamber of Commerce and
Industry in 2006, should be highlighted, especially bearing in
mind the fact that Germany is Hungary’s most important
trading partner and is the main source of foreign investors at
the same time. According to the findings of this survey,
Hungary was in the lowest third in the rankings of the new
EU member states and candidates in nearly every factor
determining investments (e.g. productivity, availability of
well-qualified labour force, or payment discipline).
The cost of capital is determined by the costs of production
and investments, and the uncertainty (risk premium)
associated with these. The change in these factors also had an
investment-reducing impact: partly due to the fact that the
purchase of investment assets has become more expensive as
the construction and machinery prices accelerated starting
from the second half of 2005 and lasting up to mid-2006, the
background of which was the significant weakening of the
exchange rate which can also be seen as a country-specific
factor.
25 Furthermore, although there was no significant
change in the financing costs of capital (as shown in the
interest rates and yields of long-term bank loans and of the
bond markets), the uncertainties surrounding the macro-
economic and micro-economic expectations of future profit
prospects may have increased the perceived risks of
Hungarian investments. Hence, it increased the expected
yield of investment projects, that is, ultimately, the discount
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Source: Doing Business in 2005, 2006 (World Bank).
Source: Global Competitiveness Report, 2001-2002 and 2006-2007, Growth Competitiveness Index (World Economic Forum). Higher values indicate
more competitive economies according to the index. 
24 According to another widely recognised and often cited rating source, the Competitiveness Yearbook of the Swiss IMD institute, Hungary’s relative position also
deteriorated in the region between 2005 and 2006. However, in 2007, presumably due to the start of the government’s fiscal measures, only Hungary could hold our
its position in the region, whilst other countries slipped back.
25There was no general, significant price increase of the investment assets in the region and the developed European countries, unlike in Hungary.
Hungary Czech Republic Slovakia Slovenia Poland Estonia Latvia Lithuania
2001 4.87 4.41 4.36 4.70 4.30 4.87 4.19 4.27
2006 4.43 4.55 4.52 4.77 3.88 5.08 4.45 4.39
Table 1
Growth and competitiveness indices of the World Economic Forum in the region’s countries
Hungary Czech Republic Slovakia Slovenia Poland Estonia Latvia Lithuania
2005 60 50 34 56 74 17 31 15
2006 66 52 36 61 75 17 24 16
Table 2
Rank of the region’s countries in World Bank’s “Doing Business in …” business environment rankingrate of the projects.
26 The frequent changes in the business
environment generate significant uncertainty in companies’
planning and do not encourage long-term investments. It
must also be taken into account that Hungary’s tax system
has undergone several changes over the last few years, and
has not seen significant simplification. Moreover, the
probability of further rises in companies’ financial burdens
was boosted by the increasingly unfavourable fiscal situation,
and these factors have also had a negative impact on domestic
investment plans.
All of these factors (signs of slowing down of productivity,
significant macro-economic and micro-uncertainty,
unfavourable business environment) can explain the weak
investment activity which was already seen before the
announcement of the fiscal adjustment, and they also increase
the risk of Hungary having become a less attractive
investment target than it used to be. This argument is
supported by the preliminary figures of the rate of re-invested
incomes to profits, which dropped significantly in 2006. It
can be viewed as another sign of unfavourable perceptions
among foreign investors on the Hungarian business
environment.
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These factors may have a long-term negative impact on the
investment climate if the government’s conduct does not
improve (e.g. through a more predictable legal and taxation
environment), or in the absence of some positive measures
(simpler, more efficient operation of authorities, better public
services, etc.). The picture was improved somewhat by the
announcement of the adjustment package and the start of its
implementation, as it corrected the unsustainable fiscal
developments and hence reduced part of the uncertainties.
However, certain elements of the measures (solidarity tax,
increase in statutory supplements) increased the costs of
businesses directly, and not only were labour taxes raised, but
also those associated explicitly with corporate profits. Taking
into consideration that the companies probably understood the
necessity of fiscal adjustments, the impact of these increased
costs could have been partly considered in the investment
decisions and consequently might have appeared in the figures
prior to the announcement of the measures. The extent of this
depends on whether the companies expected that they would
have to bear this proportion of the burden of the adjustments.
Taking into account the fact that the successful, growth-
promoting fiscal adjustments of other countries in the past did
not follow the pattern of the current Hungarian adjustment
(MNB, 2006), it is quite conceivable that companies were
negatively surprised by the growth in their burdens. Thus, the
overall effect of the adjustment measures may even cause a
further worsening of the perceptions of Hungary’s
competitiveness and the expectations of the achievable
productivity in its business environment.
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Another explanation is based on less  severe, non-structural
reasons  that  lead to milder consequences than the long-term
deterioration of Hungarian competitiveness. It emphasizes
the temporary nature of different sorts of disadvantageous
investment factors. According to this argument, the
temporary, negative investment factors merely caused
companies to wait and postpone investments in spite of the
strong external economic activity. Although one negative
factor, the uncertainty regarding external economic activity,
more or less diminished towards the end of 2005, and the
prospects have become significantly more advantageous, the
role of other negative, domestic factors became increasingly
strong in maintaining a bad investment climate. Such negative
domestic factors were the price increase of investment assets,
the run-up to the general election and also the deterioration
of the fiscal situation; therefore, the companies stuck with
their wait-and-see approach, and postponed their
investments. It is likely that they perceived the
unsustainability of the fiscal situation and saw that it was in
need of adjustments, but they could not foresee its means, the
expected changes in their burdens and that was still a source
of uncertainty. The adjustment was finally implemented in
such a manner that led to an increase in companies’ burdens
and affected them unfavourably. In summary, prior to the
announcement of the adjustment package, the uncertainty
and the ensuing “wait-and-see” behaviour in the corporate
sector were the main factors restraining investment. This
explanation thus supports the argument of the transitory
nature of the poor investment performance that may turn for
the better with the solution of the fiscal problems and with
more stable macro-economic prospects.
It is hard to pin down the exact reasons and hence the
expected duration of the investment problem on the basis of
currently available data, because the increase in corporate
burdens as well as other, still prevailing competitiveness
problems may all have hindered investment activity since the
announcement of the fiscal adjustment. The investment data
of the manufacturing industry during the first quarter of
2007 is not unambiguous either: if one outstanding item is
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26 General economic uncertainty is well demonstrated in Hungary’s 5-year EUR forward yield-differential which can be seen as an index of country-related risk premium.
The movement of this index has been detached from the same index of the Visegrád countries since mid-2004, which can be viewed as a kind of ”lagging behind the
region” effect, similarly to the case of investment." 
27 One might argue that the still dynamic foreign direct investment (FDI) data of 2006 do not support this hypothesis, but one should not forget that FDI is not the only
form of funding of investments and therefore the two time-series did not show a close relationship.
28 MNB’s 2006 convergence analysis also writes about the impact of the 4% so-called ‘solidarity tax’on investment and capital expansion (Sub-chapter 4.2).filtered out, the growth rate is around a level that can only be
considered as making up for the missed investments from the
past. Furthermore, external economic activity and the
associated expectations became more and more favourable
over the last year, the relative price of investment assets
started to reduce, and the implementation of the adjustment
package began. In spite of all of these developments, the
export sector’s investments did not improve for several
quarters, and this highlights the role of factors related to
competitiveness problems. As long as the corporate sector
does not perceive substantial improvements in the domestic
business environment and in its predictability, its
expectations of future prospects of productivity and costs
will not grow more favourable either, and hence it will not
expand its capacity significantly.
29
CONCLUSIONS
Overall, the investment data project unfavourable
developments both from the aspect of future aggregate
demand and future production possibilities. It cannot yet be
said whether this is a transitory problem which will be
automatically resolved after fiscal equilibrium is restored, or
if deeper, structural causes are in the background, indicating
a deterioration in Hungarian competitiveness.
What can be concluded safely is that the missed investments
make it more difficult for Hungary to take full part in the
present European recovery. This is a major problem since the
external boom and the country’s strong export performance
should play a key role in counteracting the weak domestic
demand caused by the fiscal adjustment. Furthermore,
private economic actors’ expectations about future prospects
and the uncertainties around them are the most defining
factors of investments. Therefore, a predictable regulatory
and tax environment and a stable macroeconomic
environment are of fundamental importance for the upturn
of investments and fast economic growth and convergence. 
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